

Spring 2005

ULTRA

\$1.00

A quarterly newsletter devoted to *A WORLD AT WAR*, GMT Games' strategic simulation of World War II. To order AWAW, go to [www.gmtgames.com](http://www.gmtgames.com) or phone 1-800-523-6111.

## A PLAN FOR JAPAN

### Preparing for the 2006 Convention

by Bruce Harper

#### Introduction

There are many good reasons to attend the annual Boardgame Players Association convention in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, but the fun of preparing for a game of *A WORLD AT WAR*, then seeing how it turns out, is high on the list. Everyone who goes to the convention has a plan, although sometimes it doesn't survive the first contact with the enemy (or the dice, which might be the same thing).

The goal, at least for me, is always to try to come up with something new and different, but not completely crazy or unsound.

At the 2006 convention, I played Japan. My Axis partner was Ken Cruz, a vigorous and dangerous opponent. I wasn't sure exactly what he intended to do, although it turned out he went for Russia big time. We faced Eric Thobaben, a formidable opponent and, in the Pacific, Steve Voros. We knew they had been preparing as well.

#### My Thinking

There are two basic approaches to playing Japan in *A WORLD AT WAR*. One is to act in concert with the European Axis, in the hope of decisively affecting the course of the war. Examples include Japan:

- attacking Britain's southeast Asian possessions and India in 1941, in conjunction with a German invasion of Britain.
- raiding and invading of India in 1942, in conjunction with a European Axis drive into the Middle East.

- declaring war on Russia in 1941 or 1942, in conjunction with a German invasion of Russia.
- conducting a submarine campaign against the Western Allies, in conjunction with a German Atlantic strategy.

All of these approaches have the drawback that Japan compromises its position in order to assist its European allies. In the most extreme cases, the European Axis might win decisively while Japan gets smashed equally decisively, for a net draw. And this assumes that the joint strategy works! If it fails, Japan might get all of the drawbacks and none of the benefits.

The second basic approach is quite different. Japan doesn't worry about the European Axis, other than wishing them well, and concentrates on its own theater. While the occasional submarine or raider might be sent out if the Western Allies allow it, Japan always gives its own needs priority. If it is really true that charity begins at home, a "Japan first" strategy by Japan helps the European Axis by diverting the maximum Allied forces to the Pacific, and in the end helps the Axis as a whole by maximizing the Axis Pacific victory level.

This second approach is neither aggressive nor passive. Japan can try to capture Hawaii, cut off the sea lanes to Australia, invade Australia or India, try to crush China to free ground units or launch a preemptive attack on Russia. Or Japan can just sit and defend. The common theme is that whatever Japan does, it does to increase the chances of Japanese survival, and any direct benefits to the European Axis are secondary.

This article will discuss a Japanese plan which tries to implement the second, Japan-centric, approach.

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**Next Issue: How Did It Work?**

## Japanese resistance

**Japanese Resistance Table - 57.11**

+20	Basic Japanese resistance level.
+1	For every Pacific front objective under Japanese control.
+1	Japanese control of Singapore, Manila, Chungking, Calcutta, Dacca, Colombo, Cairns, Darwin, Irkutsk or Vladivostok (one for each).
+1	For each Hawaiian island controlled by Japan.
+1	For each Aleutian island controlled by Japan.
+2	If Australia or India has surrendered (+2 for each).
-3	Allied control of Tokyo.
-2	Allied control of Kagoshima or Osaka (-2 for each).
-1	Allied control of each non-objective hex in Japan.
-1	Allied control of Peking, Shanghai, Nanking, Canton, Harbin, Mukden, Seoul or Okinawa (-1 for each).
-#	For each atomic attack against Japan (-3 for the first attack; an additional -4 for the second attack; an additional -5 for the third attack; and so on).
-1	For each Japanese city firestormed (cumulative).
-1	For each oil effect currently applicable to Japan.
-1	For every ten unbuilt Japanese ground/army air factors.

**Explanation:** Check at the end of each Allied player turn. If the net result is zero or less, Japan surrenders and the war in the Pacific ends.

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ULTRA subscription rates (US \$) are \$1.00 (U.S.) per issue: one year (4 issues) for \$4.00; two years (8 issues) for \$8.00; three years (12 issues) for \$12.00.

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POSTMASTER: send address changes to ULTRA Publications, 2227 N 73rd street, Milwaukee, WI 53213, U.S.A.

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The Japanese player should keep the Japanese resistance modifiers in mind, even though it is not necessary to actually check the Japanese Resistance Table until late in the war. Remember too that Japanese resistance is checked at the end of the Allied player turn, so Japan is never quite as robust as it seems:

In addition to its basic +20 modifier, by late 1944 or early 1945 Japan can hope to have one or two Pacific front objectives and perhaps Singapore and Manila. After that, the modifiers will be negative:

**-5: Oil.** While frugal oil consumption can sometimes keep an oil counter or two in reserve, Japan can expect to stagger to the finish line without oil.

**-3: Firestorms.** This assumes heavy bombing capable of inflicting one firestorm per turn.

**-8: Loss of the mainland.** Japan incurs a -1 resistance modifier for the loss of each of the four Chinese objectives it controls in 1939, plus the two Manchurian objectives, Seoul (Korea) and Okinawa. A -8 modifier is incredibly pessimistic or optimistic, depending on how you look at it.

**-?: Unbuilt ground units and AAF.** At a certain point, Japan will be unable to rebuild its ground units and AAF. Some ground units will be caught in Pacific islands, southeast Asia or even China, while AAF may be scoured by American carrier attacks on the Home Islands, but this modifier usually isn't more than -3 or -4.

It can be seen that even this worst case scenario allows for continued Japanese resistance unless the U.S. invades Japan or carries out at least one, and probably two, atomic attacks on Japan. A successful American invasion gains modifiers for every hex brought under Allied control, as well as providing airbases which facilitate atomic attacks. If Japan's air defenses are too weak, an invasion may not be necessary, provided the atomic bomb is ready in time (the historical outcome).

And if Japan can avoid additional modifiers for unbuilt ground and army air units, then it might even be able to withstand an atomic attack or an invasion – although not both.

## Oil

The determining factor in assessing Japan's prospects is oil. First I will examine Japan's oil supplies, then its ability to ship oil to Japan, then the measures Japan may take to conserve oil without unduly disrupting its war effort.

## Oil Supplies

Japan starts the game with a maximum 10 oil counters in its reserve:

**33.422 MAXIMUM OIL RESERVES:** Each oil reserve may contain a maximum number of oil counters. These maximums apply to each oil reserve at the end of each player turn, and any oil counters in excess of the maximum are eliminated. The maximums and starting levels for each oil reserve are:

- ...

### B. JAPAN:

- **Maximum:** Two for each of Harbin, Kagoshima, Mukden, Osaka and Tokyo under Japanese control, for a total maximum of ten.
- **At Start:** Ten.

Until the U.S. imposes an oil embargo, Japan receives unlimited oil from the international market:

**33.4521 THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET:** Japan may obtain the indicated number of oil counters from the international market:

**A. NO EMBARGO:** Unlimited, if the U.S. has not imposed an oil embargo on Japan in a previous game turn. An oil embargo has no effect on Japan's oil supplies in the game turn in which it is imposed.

**B. PARTIAL EMBARGO:** Three oil counters per turn for the two Japanese turns after the U.S. imposes an oil embargo.

**C. FULL EMBARGO:** None, beginning in the third turn after the U.S. imposes an oil embargo.

**D. WAR:** None, if Japan and the U.S. are at war, other than in the turn in which Japan goes to war with the U.S.

**EXAMPLE:** The U.S. imposes an oil embargo on Japan in Summer 1941. Japan receives three oil counters from the international market in Fall 1941, and another three oil counters in Winter 1941. Starting in Spring 1942, Japanese oil supplies depend on Japanese control of the Dutch East Indies oil centers and the number of available Japanese transports.

### 33.45211 OIL EMBARGO:

**A. CAMPAIGN GAME:** In a Global War game, an oil embargo may be imposed at any time during a turn, including before, during or after the Japanese player turn, when USJT reach 20. Once imposed, an oil embargo cannot be lifted.

The example after 33.4521 is typical. Up to Summer 1941, when USJT hit 20, oil is not a problem. In Fall 1941, Japan receives three oil counters, which will normally be equal to its consumption (because oil effects can be taken more easily while Japan is still at peace). In Winter 1941, Japan again receives three oil counters, but will likely consume more (as discussed below). Japan should receive six oil counters in Spring 1942 if it has conquered Sumatra and Borneo:

**33.4522 BRUNEI AND PALEMBANG:** Three oil counters from each of Brunei and Palembang. Japan may only ship oil from Brunei or Palembang if they are under Japanese control at the start of the Japanese player turn. Oil counters produced in Brunei and Palembang may be shipped to the Japanese oil reserve to be used (EXCEPTION: Starting in Spring 1944, oil from Brunei and Palembang may be used in those hexes to offset naval oil effects. Japanese naval units which use oil in Brunei or Palembang must end the Japanese player turn in those ports). Oil counters which are unused by the end of the Japanese player turn are eliminated. Japan may not create an oil reserve in Brunei or Palembang.

## Transports

Japan requires three transports (rounded up) to ship each oil counter, but initially the exploitation of the Dutch East Indies oil centers also requires control of nearby objectives. However, this control may be gained during the Spring 1942 Japanese player turn, so normally Japan will meet this requirement:

**33.4523 ASSIGNING TRANSPORTS TO CARRY OIL:** During initial supply determination and in the construction and redeployment phases of the Japanese player turn, Japan may assign transports to carry oil. One transport is required to carry each oil counter produced in Brunei and Palembang. Japanese transports may carry oil from Brunei only if Japan controls Balikpapan; Japanese transports may carry oil from Palembang only if Japan controls Batavia. The number of transports which Japan may assign to carry oil each turn is limited by the number of transports available: 1-3 transports: 1 oil counter; 4-6 transports: 2 oil counters; 7-9 transports: 3 oil counters; and so on, up to a maximum of 6 oil counters per turn (the maximum oil production of Brunei and Palembang per turn). Transports which are not used to carry oil may be used for other purposes.

Japan begins the game with 18 transports:

**20.631 INITIAL LEVELS:** The initial number of transports are:

...

**E. PACIFIC (JAPAN):** 18 Japanese transports.

Japan may not produce additional transports until 1942 (see below). Japan also does not have the luxury of converting destroyers to ASW or transports:

**24.241 CONVERSION:** During each friendly unit construction phase, Britain and the U.S. may remove three destroyer factors from an SW box or any location eligible to move into an SW box (25.31) and replace them with an ASW factor or transport in that SW box, at no BRP cost, subject to the following restrictions:

...

**C. JAPAN:** Japan may not convert destroyers to ASW or transports.

The challenge for Japan is to somehow ship the maximum allowable number of oil counters for as many turns as possible. The key is for Japan to have 16 transports survive American submarine warfare, which allows Japan to ship all six oil counters.

## Submarine Warfare

Both the Japanese and Western Allied ability to place RPs in projects related to submarine warfare is constrained:

**41.31 RESTRICTIONS ON RP ALLOCATION:** RPs may be allocated to the projects set out in the research and production tables as indicated, subject to the following restrictions:

...

**C. HIGH TECHNOLOGY LIMITS:** For high technology research projects (air range, jets, anti-submarine warfare, advanced submarines, rockets, radar, controlled reaction, uranium separation, plutonium production and the atomic bomb) and production projects (uranium plant and plutonium reactor production), no more than one RP may be placed

in the first year in which RPs are placed in the project; no more than two RPs may be placed in the second year in which RPs are placed in the project; and so on, with the number of RPs permitted increasing by one for each year in which RPs are placed in the project, up to the maximum number of RPs allowed for that year (41.31B). This limit also applies to such projects for which prewar research has been done, such as Axis jets and rockets.

**D. DATE RESTRICTIONS:** RPs may not be assigned to the following research and production projects until the indicated date. The 1942 YSS restriction for Western Allied and Japanese RPs applies regardless of when war breaks out between Japan and the Western Allies. Prohibited dates are indicated by shaded boxes on each alliance faction's research record sheets:

- ...
- 1942 YSS:
  - Western Allied torpedo research.
  - Japanese ASW research and production.
  - Japanese transport production.
  - Western Allied and Japanese submarine production.

The restriction on American submarine production is not particularly important, because there is a specific restriction on the number of American submarines which may engage in submarine warfare against the Japanese transports:

**25.13 USE OF SUBMARINES IN THE SW BOXES:** In order to engage in submarine SW combat in an SW box, submarines must begin their player turn in that SW box. The use of submarines for SW combat is restricted as follows:

- ...
- E. U.S.:**
  - The number of American submarines that may conduct submarine warfare in the Pacific SW box each turn is limited as follows: 1939-Summer 1942: 1; Fall and Winter 1942: 2; Spring and Summer 1943: 3; Fall and Winter 1943: 4; Spring 1944: 5; Summer 1944: 6; Fall 1944: 7; Winter 1944 and thereafter: 8. Any remaining American submarines, if built, must operate on the Pacific mapboard.
  - American submarines may not enter the Pacific SW box to conduct submarine warfare until the turn in which war breaks out between Japan and the U.S. or the turn in which the USJT level reaches 40 or more.

It is not difficult for the Americans to produce and build enough submarines to maintain this level of submarine warfare.

As mentioned above, Japan may also not convert destroyers to ASW or transports. Any increase in the number of ASW (from a starting level of 0) or transports (from a starting level of 18) must come from production in 1942 or later.

Apart from the number of submarines, ASW and transports, the variables in the American submarine campaign are found in the following modifiers, some of which Japan may influence, and some of which are beyond Japan's control:

### SW Combat Modifiers Table

#### *Submarine warfare*

##### **General:**

- +/# Naval Nationality DRM (22.552A)
- +/# air range research levels
- +# attacker torpedo research level
- # defender ASW research level

##### **Pacific:**

- 1 for every 3 CVEs in the Pacific SW box (round down): 0-2: 0; 3-5: -1; 6-8: -2; 9-11: -3; 12+: -4
- +1 Japan controls Townsville, Noumea, Suva or any port in the Hawaiian Islands (Japanese submarines only)
- +2 Allies control Manila (American submarines only)
- +/-1 Magic codebreaking advantage

It is possible to work out the expected value of these modifiers in 1942, the first year of the American submarine campaign:

**Naval Nationality DRM:** Japan begins the game with a Naval Nationality DRM of 3, one higher than the Western Allies. It is not easy to hold this advantage, though, because the Western Allies will research radar (each radar result yields a +1 modifier for Naval Nationality DRM research) and because the negative feedback modifier for the Western Allies is only -2, while it is -3 for Japan (the higher the Naval Nationality DRM, the greater the negative feedback modifier). For the sake of argument, it can be assumed that the Japanese and Western Allied Naval Nationality DRMs will be equal.

**Air Range:** Here the Western Allies have an advantage. Just as for Naval Nationality DRM research, the Western Allies have a big incentive to research air range, because it helps defend against German submarines and raiders, assists against Japanese transports and enhances Western Allied strategic bombing against both Germany and Japan. The Western Allies can be expected to have two air range research results by 1942 or 1943. Japan may comfortably get one air range research result by 1942, but only if it allocates RPs to air range research. The Western Allies will therefore have a net air range modifier of +1 or +2.

**Torpedoes:** Torpedoes are not a high technology project, so the Americans can almost guarantee a result if they really want one. The Japanese should assume they do, but in practice the demands of the Atlantic campaign are at their greatest in 1942 and it is by no means a given that the Western Allies can assign three or four RPs to torpedo research, or even switch RPs to

offset a poor die roll. We will give the Western Allies a torpedo modifier of +1.

**ASW:** ASW research is a high technology project, so Japan may only put one RP in ASW research in 1942. With two naval general research breakthroughs (by no means a sure thing), Japan will get an ASW result on a die roll of “3”, which can be guaranteed by switching RPs from other naval projects. Japan probably wouldn’t bother, but all things considered, we will assume a Japanese ASW research modifier of -1.

**Manila:** The SW modifier for Manila is simply a design mechanism to force Japan to take the Philippines quickly. Japan will do so, so no modifier.

**Codebreaking:** The U.S. has a codebreaking advantage, because of their Magic wild card, but often the American player will have better uses for this card. Sometimes the American player will get a codebreaking modifier, and sometimes he won’t. Japan will rarely get one. We shall give codebreaking a +1.

The net SW modifier in 1942 will therefore be around +2 or +3, in favor of the American submarines. In practice, of course, this may be pessimistic, because in 1942 the Western Allies have their own naval problems that drain away RPs, so the actual net SW modifier may be more like +1.



## The American Submarine Campaign

The American submarine campaign in the Pacific differs significantly from the German submarine campaign in the Atlantic. In game terms, the American campaign is modifier-oriented, rather than dependent on the number of submarine factors conducting SW, as is often the case in the Atlantic. In the Atlantic, a high proportion of the Western Allied transports knocked out of action will be damaged (the number after the “/”), while in the Pacific a high proportion of the Japanese transports will be sunk (the number before the “/”). The losses stem both from the pro-American modifiers and the inability of the small number of Japanese ASW to prevent the American submarines from getting to the Japanese transports.

This means the American submarine campaign has two significant effects. One is to impede the shipment of oil to Japan; the other is to force Japan to divert shipbuilding to replacing transports.

A review of the top rows of the SW Combat Table makes this clear.

SW Fac	Dice Roll											
	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12+	
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0/1	0/1	0/2	1/1	
2	0	0	0	0	0/1	0/1	0/1	0/2	0/2	1/1	1/2	
3	0	0	0/1	0/1	0/2	0/2	0/2	1/1	1/1	1/2	1/3	
4	0	0/1	0/2	0/2	1/1	1/1	1/1	1/2	1/2	1/3	1/4	
5	0/1	0/2	1/1	1/1	1/2	1/2	1/2	1/3	1/3	1/4	1/5	
6	0/2	1/1	1/2	1/2	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/4	1/4	1/5	1/6	

One Japanese ASW factor, especially with negative modifiers, is unlikely to do anything. Two ASW factors are much better, and have a reasonable chance of stopping a submarine from getting through to the transports, and therefore would prevent a transport from being sunk. Three ASW are likely to save two transports.

From the point of view of the American submarines, even four submarines (the maximum until the end of 1943) are likely to get only a 1/1 or a 1/2 SW combat result. Their main effect will be from the SW combat modifiers (each of which sinks a transport) and from submarines which get through to the transports (each of which also sinks a transport unless negated by a pro-Japanese SW combat modifier).

## 1942

As discussed above, in Summer 1942, one American submarine will likely get a 0/1 result (assuming a SW combat dice roll of “7”, as for all the ensuing analysis). The net result will therefore be around 3/1 or 4/1, as the net + modifier will sink transports and the American submarine itself will probably make it through to the Japanese transports. In Fall and Winter 1942, the two American submarines will achieve something like a 4/1, 4/2, 5/1 or 5/2 result, as both American submarines get through to the Japanese transports.

This is a worst case scenario. It not only assumes a Western Allied +1 torpedo result, but assumes it will come into play early in the year, although in reality naval general and ASW, and possibly naval nationality DRM, research will take priority. It also assumes two Western Allied air range research results, and possibly

no corresponding Japanese air range research result.

If Japan doesn't increase its transport level by producing transports in 1942, a 3/1 or 4/1 result will cost Japan an oil counter ( $18 - 4 = 14$ ;  $18 - 5 = 13$ ; either result allows Japan to ship five oil counters). Each additional 1942 transport increases the chances that six oil counters can be shipped. Similarly, each favorable SW modifier reduces the Japanese transport losses and increases the chances that six oil counters can be shipped.

Even under unfavorable circumstances, Japan can therefore count on getting five oil counters per turn in 1942, assuming that it takes the required Dutch East Indies objectives in Winter 1941 or Spring 1942. If Japan ends 1942 with 10 oil counters in its oil reserve, it will have reason to celebrate.

## 1943

1943 is a crucial year. By then, the Western Allies are very likely to have a Naval Nationality DRM result, a second air range result, and at least one torpedo result. But Japan might have a second air range result, and perhaps two ASW increases. The net SW modifier in 1943 should be around +1 or +2.

As for the numbers of submarines, ASW and transports, the U.S. may use three submarines in Spring and Summer 1943, and four submarines in Fall and Winter 1943. Against these the Japanese may expect to have three ASW, which should stop two of the American submarines.

The expected Japanese losses, both sunk and damaged, should be around four or five transports per turn.

This implies that in 1943 Japan should aim to have around 21 or 22 transports, in order to ship all six oil counters.

## 1944 and beyond

Barring an Axis victory in Europe, it is difficult to see how Japan can maintain its oil supplies into 1944. The number of American submarines attacking the Japanese convoy route increases by one each turn in 1944, up to a final maximum of eight submarines for the remainder of the game. In theory this implies that if Japan can stabilize the military situation, it can gradually surmount the American submarine threat, but in practice this can't be true. The best the Japanese can hope for is to ship some oil in 1944, and force the Americans to fight their way to the oil centers or the convoy route, rather than having it collapse completely

because of submarine warfare.

By 1944, Japan must give priority to oil conservation, although the efficient use of oil should always be a consideration.

## Oil Effects and Use

### Oil Effects

Each turn, the Japanese player has the option of taking one or more oil effects. Here they are:

**33.61 OIL EFFECTS:** During his player turn, as set out in 33.52, the moving player determines which, if any, of the five oil effects set out below he wishes to offset. Oil effects apply to all members of an alliance faction within the affected supply zones. The effects are:

#### A. AIR:

- All air units have their Air Nationality DRM reduced by one.
- Land-based air units may not conduct offensive operations, search, provide air cover, or attack enemy naval units at sea.
- Offensive strategic warfare by strategic bombers, flying bombs and rockets is prohibited.
- Defensive air activities, including providing defensive air support, opposing enemy bombing and intercepting enemy air transport activities, are permitted only in the hex in which the air units are based. Interceptors defend normally.
- The restrictions on searching, providing air cover, attacking enemy naval units at sea and on defensive air activities do not apply to Japanese air units in Japan.
- Air units may stage and redeploy freely from affected bases.

#### B. NAVAL:

- All naval units have their Naval Nationality DRM reduced by one (EXCEPTION: Western Allied naval units, including ASW, in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Ocean SW boxes are not subject to oil effects – 33.4715E).
- Naval units may not conduct offensive operations, protect sea supply or provide or protect sea escort.
- Two fewer dice are initially rolled for all naval interceptions.
- Raider die rolls are subject to a -1 modifier (this adverse modifier does not apply if the defender keeps affected naval units in port, relying only on unimpaired naval units to attempt raider interception).
- Naval units may stage and redeploy freely from affected ports.

#### C. ARMY:

- All ground units of all types have their CTL reduced by one.
- Ground units may not sea transport, conduct seaborne invasions or be NRed from a location subject to the army oil effect.
- Ground units may not be taken as attrition losses from a supply zone from which sea supply was last traced to their attrition zone (14.52A).
- Armor units, including those which exploited in the previous turn, and British and American mechanized infantry units in Europe lose their mechanized component and act as infantry units, although they may conduct offensive operations and their combat factor for attrition and defensive purposes is unaffected. Such units have their movement factor reduced to three factors in Europe and two factors in the Pacific, lose their ZoC, may not create breakthroughs or exploit, and may be subject to a -1 DM if attacked by exploiting enemy armor. These effects do not apply to Japanese armor units in Japan.

**D. CONSTRUCTION:** Construction at normal construction costs requires the expenditure of oil counters. Subject to overall construction limits, each affected major power may build up to 25 BRPs of units at normal construction costs if no oil counters are expended; up to 50 BRPs if one oil counter is expended; up to 75 BRPs if two oil counters are expended, and so on (27.35). Additional units are built at double the normal construction cost (27.13B; see also 27.14). A major power is considered to have incurred the construction oil effect if it does not spend at least one oil counter to allow up to 50 BRPs of builds at normal construction cost. See 33.72 for the use of additional oil counters for construction in conjunction with uninverting air and naval factors and exploiting armor.

**E. ECONOMIC:** The BRP base and BRP level of each affected major power is reduced by ten percent (round down) of its current BRP base or by 10 BRPs, whichever is greater, each turn. If the economic oil effect is not offset prior to unit construction, the construction limits of the affected major powers are reduced accordingly.

In addition, here are the rules relating to uninverting air and naval units and the use of additional oil counters:

**33.71** Subject to the restrictions set out in 33.74:

**A. AIR:** If an oil counter is used by an alliance faction to offset the air oil effect, that alliance faction may uninvert 25 land-based air factors at any time during its player turn.

**B. NAVAL:** If an oil counter is used by an alliance faction to offset the naval oil effect, that alliance faction may uninvert 25 naval factors at any time during its player turn. Carrier-based NAS are uninverted along with their carriers, at no extra cost (17.3122).

**C. ARMY:** If an oil counter is used by an alliance faction to offset the army oil effect, that alliance faction may exploit with 25 armor factors during the exploitation phase of its player turn.

**33.72 USE OF ADDITIONAL OIL COUNTERS:** Additional air and naval factors may be uninverted, or additional armor units used to exploit, beyond the limits associated with offsetting the air, naval and army oil effects (33.71), or additional construction at normal construction cost allowed beyond the 50 BRPs associated with offsetting the construction oil effect, by the use of additional oil counters, provided the air, naval or armor units in question are not subject to oil effects. Each oil counter used by an alliance faction in addition to any oil counters used to offset air, naval, army and construction oil effects allows the alliance faction to, at its option:

**A.** Uninvert additional air or naval factors, or exploit with additional armor factors, or construct additional BRPs of units at normal construction cost, up to a total of 25 air or naval factors uninverted, armor factors exploiting, or additional BRPs of construction, in any combination.

**B.** Uninvert all air factors.

**C.** Uninvert the naval units in two TFs.

In what circumstances can Japan reasonably expect to take these oil effects?

### Air

Until Japan is back at the home islands in 1944-45, the air oil effect can almost never be taken. The defensive abilities of air units based in Japan are not affected by oil shortages, although the uninversion of newly constructed air units still requires oil. So even at the end of the game, it is important that Japan have some oil in reserve to uninvert its air units. It is also important to remember that interceptors defend against

bombing even if Japan is out of oil.

### Naval

Similarly, the naval oil effect can almost never be taken until late in the war. For many reasons, Japan needs its navy. However, if the Japanese navy has been destroyed, the naval oil effect no longer has meaning.

### Army

Ground fighting is not as important in the Pacific theater as in Europe, at least if Japan carries out an air-naval strategy aimed at the United States. In contrast to Europe, the most important adverse effect of the army oil effect is the prohibition against deploying ground units by sea. In turns where the deployments of ground units isn't essential, Japan may take the army oil effect.

### Construction

The construction oil effect has changed. A major power may build up to 25 BRPs of units at normal construction cost without using an oil counter; 26-50 BRPs of construction at normal construction cost requires one oil counter; 51-75 BRPs of construction at normal construction cost requires two oil counters; and so on. A major power may not exceed its construction limit, but it may construct units at double the normal construction cost if oil is not used.

This means Japan can reduce its oil use by either deferring builds or by spending double. For example, if Japan has a construction limit of 70 BRPs and 60 BRPs of units to build, it may use two oil counters and build 60 BRPs of units; use one oil counter and build 50 BRPs of units, and either leave the other 10 BRPs of units unbuilt or build them for 20 BRPs (or something in between); or use no oil counters and build 25 BRPs of units, and either leave the other 35 BRPs of units unbuilt or build 22 BRPs of them at a cost of another 44 BRPs (or something in between).

This makes unit construction much more interesting and challenging than it used to be. It is not just a question of Japan buying its way out of oil problems, because spending BRPs at twice the normal construction rate will cut into future Japanese growth, which will make it harder to make up for future oil shortages because the Japanese construction limit will not have increased as much as it might have and because Japan will have fewer BRPs. And leaving units unbuilt creates its own problems, because the units are not available to fight. The interplay between oil, BRPs and units on the board is fascinating and gives players

the opportunity to make both right and wrong decisions. These opportunities are probably greatest for the Japanese player, as Japan faces oil problems almost throughout the game.

A projection of the Japanese BRP levels is necessary, but the preliminary conclusion is that Japan's opportunities for conserving oil are greatest in relation to construction.

### **Economic**

The economic oil effect is harsh, because the last thing Japan needs is to run out of BRPs, and because it reduces the Japanese construction limit, so Japan should only take the economic oil effect late in the game.

### **1941**

Up to and including Summer 1941, when the U.S. imposes a partial oil embargo, oil consumption is not an issue for Japan.

In Fall 1941, Japan will receive three oil counters from the international market. To maintain its reserve of ten oil counters, Japan will have to take two oil effects. If the Japanese have planned carefully, by positioning all invading forces in Summer 1941, in Fall 1941 Japan may take the air, army and naval oil effects. At the end of Fall 1941, Japan's oil reserve will contain ten oil counters.

Winter 1941 is a different matter. Japan will attack the Western Allies and therefore cannot take the air, naval or army oil effects, nor will it take the economic oil effect. Because it runs out of BRPs by the end of 1941, Japan will take the construction oil effect. The problem is the Japanese navy, all (approximately) 120 factors of which will be fully used in Japan's initial attack. 25 factors may be uninverted without using any additional oil counters. After that, two TFs may be uninverted by using one additional oil counter.

Japan does not need to uninvert its entire navy in Winter 1941, because the Western Allied capacity for naval action in Winter 1941 is limited (offensive operations are prohibited (51.73A) and in any case there won't be that many Western Allied naval units to worry about). Since Japan won't have an oil surplus in Spring 1942, it can be efficient in its use of oil and in Winter 1941 should uninvert only TFs which contain a full 25 naval factors. This will probably mean using one additional oil counter, uninverting a total of 75 naval factors. The rest can be uninverted in Spring 1942, as needed. At the end of Winter 1941, Japan's oil reserve will contain eight oil counters.

### **1942**

In Spring 1942, Japan will receive six oil counters, as American submarine warfare will not yet have started. Japan will attack again, offset the economic oil effect, and will construct at least 50 BRPs of units (spring turns always put pressure on construction limits, because of air and military production). Japan will therefore use five oil counters right away.

To complete its basic conquests, Japan may not have to use its entire navy, but it's safe to assume that it will use an additional two oil counters to uninvert naval units left inverted from Winter 1941 and which are inverted in Spring 1942 operations. At the end of Spring 1942, Japan's oil reserve will contain seven oil counters.

Summer 1942 is more difficult to assess. Japan will ship either five or six oil counters, and will likely offset the "basic three" oil effects (air, naval and economic). Whether Japan will also offset the army and construction oil effects, and use additional oil counters to uninvert naval units, will depend on how aggressive Japan tries to be, and where this aggression takes place. A continental strategy, attacking in India, China or Russia, will relieve oil pressure on the Japanese navy and will probably allow Japan to limit its oil consumption to four or five oil counters. A naval strategy will increase this by one or two oil counters. For the sake of argument, let's assume the latter and say that at the end of Summer 1942, Japan's oil reserve will contain five oil counters.

In Fall 1942, with its oil reserve half empty, Japan must start conserving oil. Unless Japan is following a continental strategy (in which case it will have one or two more oil counters, because of limited naval usage), Fall 1942 is a good turn for Japan to take the army oil effect. To do so, Japan must have enough 1-3 infantry units in position to take attrition losses in China and southeast Asia. It might also be possible for Japan to take the construction oil effect, and defer rebuilding some losses until Winter 1942. This will depend on the intensity of air combat with the Western Allies in the south Pacific. Assuming five oil counters shipped to Japan, at the end of Fall 1942, Japan's oil reserve will contain seven oil counters.

Winter 1942 is hard to predict, as with each passing turn the permutations increase. As a general rule, however, Japan is unlikely to be able to take the army and construction oil effects two turns in a row, because reinforcements must be sent out to Japan's conquests and unbuilt units must be brought into play. Japan will therefore have to use at least five oil counters in Winter

1942, and at the end of Winter 1942, Japan's oil reserve will still contain seven oil counters.

### 1943

By 1943, Japan is unlikely to be engaging in offensive naval activities, so it can budget for using four or five oil counters per turn. Japan's oil reserves should stay at around six or seven oil counters throughout 1943, but it may be possible to increase the level of the Japanese oil reserve by building some units at double cost. Alternating army and construction oil effects is still a potentially viable strategy.



### 1944

By 1944, Japan will be under increasing pressure. If the Americans have fought their way to within range of the Dutch East Indies oil centers, the Japanese oil position will collapse. If not, Japan can soldier on, although it can expect to ship more like three or four oil counters per turn. However, Japan can avail itself of this rule:

**33.4522 BRUNEI AND PALEMBANG:** Three oil counters from each of Brunei and Palembang. Japan may only ship oil from Brunei or Palembang if they are under Japanese control at the start of the Japanese player turn. Oil counters produced in Brunei and Palembang may be shipped to the Japanese oil reserve to be used (EXCEPTION: Starting in Spring 1944, oil from Brunei and Palembang may be used in those hexes to offset naval oil effects. Japanese naval units which use oil in Brunei or Palembang must end the Japanese player turn in those ports). Oil counters which are unused by the end of the Japanese player turn are eliminated. Japan may not create an oil reserve in Brunei or Palembang.

This means the Japanese may uninvert naval units by basing them in Brunei or Palembang. These are not ideal locations, but the naval units may be moved to better ports once fueled, and in any case the war may come to them, as happened historically. Assuming Japan has a navy left by 1944, its oil needs may be met

without using transports.

### The Endgame

Once Japan heads into free fall, it will probably start taking the economic oil effect and will start rebuilding units at double the BRP cost, both of which will conserve oil. As mentioned earlier, Japan needs to keep one or two oil counters available to uninvert air units in Japan. If Japan enters 1945 with five oil counters in its reserve, it has a reasonable chance of making the Western Allies fight for a 1945 conquest.

### Japan: 1939-1942

Japan's preparation for 1939-1942 covers three distinct, but related, areas:

- Japanese mobilizations, BRP levels and research.
- The initial attacks to gain control of the historic Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.
- Utilizing Japan's initiative for the remainder of 1942.

The Japanese must meet the challenge of balancing the demands of Japan's initial attack (ground units, air and DDs) and the requirements of a prolonged war against the Allies (dealing with the American submarine and bombing campaigns and having sufficient oil and forces to fight).

### Mobilizations, BRP levels and research

#### Mobilizations and USJT

The projection for U.S.-Japanese tensions, Japanese mobilizations and Japan's BRP levels (assuming three BRPs of attrition losses in China each turn) for 1939-1941 are set out below. The Japanese mobilizations, production and resulting force pools are set out at the end of this article.

This is by no means the only possible mobilization/tension profile for Japan. One alternative is to defer the third Japanese mobilization until 1941, and instead increase Japan's shipbuilding level to five in 1940 (using the second Japanese mobilization for the first shipbuilding increase and production for the second shipbuilding increase).

Many players focus unduly on the USJT for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. It's certainly nice to catch an American carrier or two at Pearl, but this is still a matter of luck, even if USJT are low. The really crucial threshold to avoid is allowing USJT to reach 20 before Summer 1941, because this triggers the

American oil embargo, allowing Russian units to transfer from Siberia to Europe. These additional Russian units would then be available to defend against the German Fall 1941 attacks, which are crucial (in extreme cases, if Japan really pushed up USJT, they could even be available to defend against the initial German attack in Summer 1941). While sympathy for their ally shouldn't cloud the vision of Japanese planners, this would be a bit much.

## Japanese actions turn by turn

Japan's turn-by-turn mobilizations and expenditures are set out below. For mobilizations, the turn in parentheses is the turn in which the mobilized forces can be constructed.

### At Start

Japan starts with a BRP base of 70, 40 BRPs and 6 RPs.

### Fall 1939

Japan adds 10 BRPs from its automatic Fall 1939 mobilization (M1). Japan spends 9 BRPs on shipbuilding (launching the *Hiryu* and a CA2, and advancing the *Musashi*) and builds two NAS, one 2-3 armor unit, one 1-3 armor unit and three 3-2 infantry units, for a total of 26 BRPs of construction, equal to Japan's construction limit (using oil for construction doesn't matter, because Japan gets unlimited oil supplies from the international market). Japan ends the turn with 24 BRPs.

USJT are at 2.

Japan mobilizes:

- 11 NAS (six in Fall 1940; five deferred until Spring 1941)
- one AAF (Fall 1940)
- one 3-3 armor unit (Spring 1941)

The purpose of mobilizing the 3-3 armor unit, with its longer lead time, and deferring 5 NAS until 1941 is to maximize BRP growth in the 1941 YSS.

### Winter 1939

Japan spends 9 BRPs on shipbuilding (advancing the *Yamato* and laying down DD2) and builds three 1-2 infantry units and one 1-2 airborne unit for a total of 15 BRPs of construction. Japan ends the turn with 9 BRPs.

USJT are at 3.

### 1940 YSS

Japan's base increases from 80 to 84. Japan adds 20 BRPs for conquests in China, for a BRP total of 104. Japan receives 8 RPs.

### Spring 1940

Japan spends 9 BRPs on shipbuilding (advancing the *Shokaku* and laying down DD2; Japan would like to build something more interesting, but every DD counts) and builds three newly-produced NAS and three 1-2

**USJT, Mobilizations and Japanese BRPs**

	1939		1940				1941			
	Fal	Win	Spr	Sum	Fal	Win	Spr	Sum	Fal	Win
Automatic	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1
<b>Mobilizations</b>					+1	+2	+2	+2	+2	+3
<b>Oil embargo</b>								+1	+1	+1
<b>Fr. Indochina</b>								+1	+1	+1
Shipbuilding					+1					
Ship launches	+1						+1	+1		(+1)
Paris				+2						
Actual level	2	3	4	7	10	13	17	23	28	34
Japan. mob.	M1				M2	M3				M4
U.S. mob.					M1			M2		M3
BRP base	70	80	84		94	104	132			142
BRP level	40	24	104	89	75	64	152	122	91	67

## Research

Japan's research allocations are set out in the table at page 15. Japan's main goals are to get a radar result (both to reduce surprise in naval combat and to help fight American bombers, but also as a modifier for Air and Naval Nationality DRM research), a 1942 Naval Nationality DRM result (to reduce the effectiveness of American submarines, toughen Japanese ships against air attack and to assist in fleet combat), and a 1942 or 1943 Air Nationality DRM result (for air combat and to fight the American bombers). Japan also hopes to get two naval general research breakthroughs, both to ensure the Naval Nationality DRM result and to improve the chances of ASW research results in 1942 and 1943.

infantry units. This leaves Japan with 89 BRPs, although if Japan fails to achieve an air general research breakthrough in Spring 1940, the NAS may not show up and Japan would have 92 BRPs.

USJT are at 4.

### Summer 1940

Japan spends 9 BRPs on shipbuilding (advancing the *Zuikaku* and laying down DD2) and builds two produced NAS and three 1-2 infantry units. This leaves Japan with 75 BRPs, although without the produced NAS Japan would have 80 BRPs.

USJT are at 7.

### Fall 1940

Japan spends 12 BRPs on shipbuilding (advancing the *Musashi* and laying down DD3) and builds three NAS, one AAF and three 1-2 infantry units. This leaves Japan with 64 BRPs (without the produced NAS Japan would have 69 BRPs).

Japan occupies northern French Indochina.

Japan mobilizes:

- one shipbuilding
- one 1-2 infantry unit (Spring 1941)
- one 2-2 infantry unit (Spring 1941)
- two AAF (Fall 1941)
- six NAS (Fall 1941)

USJT are at 10.

### Winter 1940

Japan spends 12 BRPs on shipbuilding (advancing the *Yamato* and laying down DD3) and builds three NAS and three 1-2 infantry units. This leaves Japan with 56 BRPs (without the produced NAS Japan would have 61 BRPs).

This BRP total may vary, because the Chinese attritions may cost Japan less than three BRPs per turn (they are unlikely to cost more). The Winter 1940 mobilization ensures that Japan won't have to forego laying down one or more DDs in order to get 25 BRPs of growth in the 1941 YSS, and the RP that goes with it.

Japan mobilizes:

- four 1-2 infantry units (Summer 1941)
- two 2-2 infantry units (Summer 1941)
- two 3-2 infantry units (Summer 1941)
- two AAF (Winter 1941)

USJT are at 13.

### 1941 YSS

Japan's base increases from 104 to 132. Japan adds 20 BRPs for conquests in China, for a BRP total of 152. Japan receives 10 RPs.

### Spring 1941

Japan spends 12 BRPs on shipbuilding (launching the *Shokaku* and laying down DD3) and builds three NAS, one 3-3 armor unit, one 1-2 marine, three 1-2 infantry units lost in China, one 1-2 infantry unit and one 2-2 infantry unit. This leaves Japan with 122 BRPs.

USJT are at 17.

### Summer 1941

Japan spends 12 BRPs on shipbuilding (launching the *Zuikaku* and laying down DD3) and builds two NAS, three 1-2 infantry units lost in China, and four 1-2, two 2-2 and two 3-2 infantry units (from its Winter 1940 mobilization). This leaves Japan with 91 BRPs.

Japan occupies Saigon and the U.S. imposes an oil embargo. Japan deploys the ground units required to attack into northern and central Burma to north French Indochina, because in Fall 1941 Japan will take the army oil effect and the NR of ground units will be prohibited.

USJT are at 23.

### Fall 1941

Japan spends 12 BRPs on shipbuilding (advancing the *Musashi*, laying down DD2 and building the second Japanese submarine factor) and builds three NAS, two AAF and three 1-2 infantry units lost in China. This leaves Japan with 67 BRPs.

Japan gains control of the rest of French Indochina.

Japan takes the army and naval oil effects.

USJT are at 28.

### Winter 1941

Japan attacks, with USJT at 34. Japan can take Hong Kong and still have even BRPs left over for essential construction (12 BRPs for shipbuilding and three BRPs for NAS).

Japan will take the construction oil effect.

Japan mobilizes:

- one 1-2 infantry unit (Summer 1942)
- two 2-2 infantry units (Summer 1942)
- one 3-2 infantry unit (Summer 1942)
- four AAF (available in Winter 1942)

## The initial Japanese attack

To optimize the initial Japanese attack, the Japanese must be familiar with the deployment restrictions and surprise rules that apply to various areas:

### Manchuria

Japan and Russia each begin the game with 45 BRPs of units in Manchuria and Siberia, including five AAF and six armor factors.

The first point is that Russia may not transfer Siberian units to Europe until one of three events occurs:

**81.42 REDUCING THE SIBERIAN GARRISON:** Russia may not reduce its Siberian garrison by transferring Siberian units to the Urals box until the Allied redeployment phase after at least one of the following conditions is met:

**A. WAR WITH GERMANY:** Russia and Germany are at war.

**B. OIL EMBARGO AGAINST JAPAN:** The U.S. has imposed an oil embargo on Japan.

**C. JAPANESE REDUCTION OF MANCHURIAN GARRISON:** Japan reduces the size of its Manchurian garrison, which it may do at any time. Russia may then transfer forces of the same type from Siberia to Europe. The size of the Japanese Manchurian garrison is determined at the start of the Russian player turn. Fractions are rounded in favor of Russia: if Japan has fewer than six armor factors in Manchuria, a Russian 3-3 armor unit may be transferred; if Japan has fewer than three armor factors in Manchuria, a second Russian 3-3 armor unit may be transferred.

In most games, the German attack on Russia (81.42A) and the imposition of the oil embargo (81.42B) both occur in Summer 1941. Unless Japan attacks Britain in 1941 or tries to knock out China before attacking the Western Allies, there is no reason for Japan to reduce its Manchurian garrison and thereby allow an early Siberian transfer. Even a few additional units might significantly improve Russia's defenses against a German attack, so the Manchurian garrison should be considered inviolable until Summer 1941, at which point Japan should withdraw its air and armor units for employment against the Western Allies in Winter 1941.

The Japanese then have to decide just how much they can reduce the Manchurian garrison. Once one of the 81.42A or B triggering events has occurred, the extent to which Japan reduces the Manchurian garrison has no effect on the extent to which Russia may transfer forces to Europe – Russia may transfer no more than 15 BRPs of units:

**81.43 MINIMUM GARRISON REQUIREMENT:** Russia may not reduce the Siberian garrison to less than 30 BRPs of units until Russia and Japan have gone to war.

However, the size of the Manchurian garrison does affect Russia's ability to attack Japan:

### 81.51 RESTRICTIONS:

**A. JAPANESE DECLARATION OF WAR ON RUSSIA:** There are no restrictions on when Japan may declare war on Russia.

**B. RUSSIAN DECLARATION OF WAR ON JAPAN:** Russia may declare war on Japan only if the BRP value of the Russian units adjacent to or one hex away from Manchuria or Japanese-controlled hexes in northern China is at least twice the BRP value of the Manchurian garrison. Siberian garrison units which do not meet this requirement are not counted. This restriction does not apply if:

- The BRP value of the Manchurian garrison is less than 30 BRPs;
- Germany has surrendered; or
- Russia and Japan have been at war and Russia wishes to resume hostilities against Japan following a Russian surrender (60.82).

To be completely safe, Japan should leave 30 BRPs of units in Manchuria. If Russia increases its Siberian garrison to 60 BRPs of units, Japan adds one more BRP of units to its Manchurian garrison, so that when Russia wants to declare war, it is a step behind.

However, this excessive caution is unwarranted in 1941 if Germany attacks Russia. It is difficult to imagine Russia being able to afford 35 BRPs to declare war on Japan in 1941, even though the tension effects in both theaters are minimal. Japan would not lose anything of significance, because Russia would be too weak to invade Manchuria, and the Japanese would inflict attrition losses on Russia and would likely be able to take Vladivostok in 1942.

The best approach for Japan is to remove its armor and three infantry factors from Manchuria in Summer 1941, once an 81.42A or B triggering event has occurred. Since oil isn't a problem in Summer 1941, the ground units withdrawn from Manchuria may be NRed to suitable locations. This leaves 30 BRPs of units in Manchuria, so Russia may not declare war on Japan.

In Fall 1941, after Russia has transferred units to the Urals box to help stem the German onslaught, Japan should remove its five AAF from Manchuria, leaving 15 BRPs of units to defend Manchuria. In theory, Russia could then declare war on Japan, but in practice a Russian attack on Japan would be suicidal.

This allows Japan to use four armor units, three infantry units and five AAF from the Manchurian garrison in its initial attack against the Western Allies. Depending on the situation, sometime in 1942 Japan may then bring its Manchurian garrison back up to 30 BRPs of units, preventing a Russian declaration of war on Japan until late in the game.

Depending on the situation on the eastern front, Japan might well take more units out of Manchuria, but

Japan must be careful not to allow a surprise Russian declaration of war, followed by a gradual buildup. Once the German threat to Russia has ebbed, Japan must restore the Manchurian garrison to 30 BRPs.

### China

From 1939-1941, that portion of the Japanese army which is not garrisoning Manchuria doesn't have much else to do besides attrition the Chinese. Because Japan will take an army oil effect in Fall 1941, any Japanese ground units which must be withdrawn from China for the attack on the Western Allies should be NRed into position no later than Summer 1941.

Usually Japan does not need many units from China to carry out its initial attacks against the Western Allies.

### Hong Kong

Hong Kong is defended by a single British replacement, and is easily attacked by Japanese units in Canton. The only question is whether Japan can afford the three or four BRPs to attack Hong Kong in Winter 1941.

### Philippines

As noted earlier, the possession of Manila gives the Americans a +2 modifier for submarine warfare. However, the U.S. may not put a submarine into the Pacific SW box until Winter 1941, and therefore the first turn of American submarine warfare will be Spring 1942. This means Manila must be captured by Japan no later than Spring 1942.

The American and Filipino forces defending the Philippines are seriously hamstrung by surprise effects, although Manila is a mountain hex and is not easy to take. Of the four Western Allied ground units which may defend the Philippines, only one (the American 2-3 infantry unit) may occupy Manila:

- Philippines: One 2-2 infantry unit, one 1-2 infantry unit and two Filipino 1-2 infantry units. Only one ground unit may be placed in Manila until war breaks out between the U.S. and Japan.

In addition, when USJT reach 26 the U.S. may, and usually does, deploy two AAF to the Philippines.

26. The U.S. may deploy two AAF from the U.S. to Lingayen (Philippines). The U.S. may leave these two AAF in the U.S.

Finally, during the Allied player turn following the Japanese attack, surviving Western Allied units in the Philippines may not move, Filipino units may not be rebuilt, and the Western Allies may not fortify Manila:

**51.73 WESTERN ALLIED SURPRISE EFFECTS:** The following restrictions do not apply to the U.S., if Japan has declared war only on

Britain (50.552), or to Russia or China:

**A. FIRST TURN:** During the Allied player turn following a Japanese declaration of war on either Britain or the U.S.:

- Western Allied units in the Philippines may not move.
- ...
- The construction of Filipino units and Western Allied airbases, ports and fortifications is prohibited in the Pacific theater.

These impairments must be considered along with the fundamental Western Allied impairment on the Japanese surprise turn:

### 51.72 SURPRISE EFFECTS DURING THE JAPANESE PLAYER TURN:

**A. GROUND UNITS:** All Western Allied infantry and replacement units are subject to a -1 DM. This does not apply to Western Allied specialized units and Nationalist and Communist Chinese units.

Manila has a defensive value of four against exploitation attacks in Winter 1941 (when no air units are within range to provide ground support) and a defensive value of six against attacks in Spring 1942.

### Dutch East Indies

The Dutch East Indies are a known quantity:

Until the outbreak of war between Britain and Japan:

- The three Dutch 1-2 infantry units must remain in Batavia, Palembang and Balikpapan, respectively.
- The Dutch AAF and navy must be based in Batavia, Palembang or Balikpapan, and are free to move between these cities.

British units may not enter the Dutch East Indies until the outbreak of war between Britain and Japan.

The Dutch AAF and naval units will have to be dealt with no matter where they set up. Each of the three key Dutch East Indies objectives will be defended by a single Dutch 1-3 infantry unit.

From the military point of view, the oil center in Brunei may be considered part of the Dutch East Indies:

- One British replacement must be in Brunei.

As noted above, to obtain six oil counters in Spring 1942, the Japanese must capture Brunei and Palembang in Winter 1941 and must capture Balikpapan and Batavia in either Winter 1941 or Spring 1942 (33.4523). All four targets contain a single Western Allied ground factor; all but Batavia also contain rough terrain.

### Malaya and Singapore

The Malay peninsula consists of two central jungle hexes framed by three clear hexes (Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and a beach on the eastern side of the peninsula).

It is difficult to know exactly how strong the Western Allied defenses in this area might be. Three

British 1-2 infantry units must remain in India, Burma, Malaya or Singapore. In addition, there may be up to eight Indian factors in the Malay peninsula (four of the 12 Indian factors must start in India or Ceylon) and up to three Australian infantry factors in the Malay peninsula (four of the ten Australian infantry factors must start in Australia). But there are other demands on the Indian and Australian forces, including the Mediterranean (up to three factors each), Burma and New Guinea.

## Burma

Burma might be considered the flip side of the Malay peninsula, as the two areas must compete for Western Allied defensive resources. The stronger the Western Allies defend one area, the weaker they will defend the other. Usually the Western Allies emphasize Malaya and Singapore, because Burma really cannot be defended.

The key to attacking Burma is French Indochina in the north and Thailand in the south.

Japan should occupy northern French Indochina in Fall 1940 and should take control of Saigon in Summer 1941 (historically this triggered the American oil embargo). This gives Japan control of the rest of French Indochina in Fall 1941 and triggers Thai association in Winter 1941 (see rules 76.41-76.43 and 89.51).

The Burmese cities, Rangoon and Mandalay, are in clear terrain and essentially indefensible. But the important hexes in Burma are the jungle/mountain hexes along the border with India, which will be vacant for the first two turns of the Japanese attack:

Until the outbreak of war between Britain and Japan:

- Western Allied units may not end their turn in jungle-mountain hexes which do not contain a city.

**A. FIRST TURN:** During the Allied player turn following a Japanese declaration of war on either Britain or the U.S:

- ...
- Western Allied units may not enter non-port jungle/mountain hexes.

**B. SECOND TURN:** During the second Allied player turn following a Japanese declaration of war on either Britain or the U.S:

- Western Allied units may not enter non-port jungle/mountain hexes.

In addition, in Summer 1942, monsoons will prevent either side from entering, attacking into or attacking out of the jungle/mountain hexes:

**34.33 MONSOONS:** Monsoons occur in summer in India, Ceylon, Burma, Thailand and French Indochina.

**34.24 MONSOONS:** Operations in areas affected by monsoons are subject to the following restrictions. These restrictions apply to all ground units, including Japanese ground units, partisans and the Chindit.

**A. MOVEMENT:** Swamp, jungle and jungle/mountain hexes affected by monsoons may not be entered by ground units during the movement phase, including by sea and air transport.

**B. COMBAT:** Ground units in swamp, jungle and jungle/mountain hexes affected by monsoons may not participate in offensive operations, including embarking for sea or air transport, seaborne invasions or airdrops; ground units in other hexes may not attack into or enter swamp, jungle and jungle/mountain hexes affected by monsoons during the combat phase. Attrition combat is permitted, although swamp, jungle and jungle/mountain hexes affected by monsoons may not be selected for attrition occupation or retreat.

In summary:

- Japan has three turns to occupy the jungle/mountain hexes along the Burmese-Indian border.
- a large Japanese force may not attack into India in Summer 1942 because of monsoons.
- a small Japanese force may not be attacked from India in Summer 1942 because of monsoons.

This initial Burmese campaign isn't a mere formality, however, because control of the mountain hexes in northern Burma prevent Western Allied units from slipping into China. This is not crucial, however, because land supply to China must be traced via the Burma Road (30.326).

## Wake and Guam

Both these American islands are undefended at the start of the war. Guam is untenable and can be captured by putting a single NAS in Saipan:

**29.71 HEX CONTROL OF ISLAND GROUPS:** The moving player gains control of all unoccupied enemy islands in a Pacific island group (4.74) at the end of the post-combat supply determination segment of his player turn without actually occupying them if:

**A.** At the end of his previous player turn, the moving player had at least one ground unit or uninverted air or naval unit on an island in the group and none of the other islands in the group was occupied by an enemy ground unit, air or naval unit, airbase, rocket base, bridgehead, railhead, port counter or fortification;

**B.** The opposing player did not trace sea supply to the island group during his player turn; and

**C.** No enemy ground unit or uninverted air or naval unit occupied any island in the island group during the opposing player turn.

In contrast, Wake can be reinforced by the U.S. and the Japanese should use one DD to occupy it in Winter 1941. The Japanese invasion is safe from interception; because Wake is 13 hexes from Pearl Harbor, the Americans will roll four dice for interception and the result is halved (because Pacific theater hexes are almost twice the size of European theater hexes).

## New Guinea, the Bismarcks and the Solomons

It is almost impossible to know how much the Western Allies will commit to the New Guinea area. New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago and the Solomon Islands are where Japan is most likely to engage the U.S. Hexes that are free for the taking in Winter 1941 may be fiercely defended even in Spring 1942. So the final question is how much the Japanese can spare for this crucial area.

I won't try to analyze this difficult topic in this article. All that can be said is that the more the Japanese have left over after they've taken care of the essential areas, the better.

### Available forces

After mobilizing and producing at set out above, Japan can expect to have the following forces available for its initial attack:

- one 3-3 armor unit, three 2-3 armor units and three 1-3 armor units.
- as much infantry as required, within limits.

- 14 AAF.
- 22 carrier-based NAS.
- 12 land-based NAS.
- approximately 29 DDs.
- various heavy ships and cruisers.

### Priorities

The most difficult part of the initial Japanese attack is to assign priorities. There are numerous targets which the Japanese would like to take, but their resources are limited. It is possible for the Japanese to try to square the circle by taking risks, but it is not so easy for Japan to recover from failure, and a conservative approach is safer.

Since Japan's basic plan is conservative, the precise extent of Japan's initial expansion is not critical, as opposed to the situation that arises when Japan plays more aggressively and intends to press on to India, Australia or the South Seas.

## Japanese research allocations 1939-1942 (projects which were not assigned RPs have been omitted)

Japanese RPs		6	8	10	10		
	Code	1939	1940	1941	1942	Min.	Max.
<b>Air</b>		1	1	1	1	8+	
Nationality DRM		-2		1		10+	
<i>Air Range</i>			1	1	1	10+	
Air Defense					1	7+	
Air Production	2,3,4,5...		1		1		
<b>Naval</b>		2	1	2	1	8+	
Nationality DRM		-3 1	2	3	1	10+	
<b>ASW Technology</b>					1	6-7	8+
ASW FP	2,3,4,5...				1		
Transport FP	1...				1		
<i>Shipbuilding</i>	2,3,4,5						
<b>Military</b>		1	1			8+	
Military Production	2,3,4,5...				1		
Specialized Units	2,3,4,5...			1			
<b>Atomic</b>						8+	
<i>Radar</i>		1	1	1		10+	

### Conclusion

The Japanese plan described in this article takes a consistent approach in trying to deal with Japan's oil and economic limitations. It is impossible for Japan to out build and out produce the U.S. One possible solution is to try to defeat the U.S. early, then set up an impenetrable perimeter to the American counterattack.

Another idea is to concentrate on quality, rather than quantity. In so doing, Japan hopes to reduce its losses and therefore minimize its construction oil use and reduce the pressure on its BRP level. To this end, in my Boardgame Players Association convention game, Japan plans to focus on radar, Naval Nationality DRM and Air Nationality DRM research.

These are all expensive projects, which can be achieved only at the cost of reduced production of air, naval and ground units. But they may pay off if they reduce Japanese losses in the inevitable air and naval battles to come, as well as lessening the effects of the American submarine and bombing campaigns.

This long-term approach, which may be trying to accomplish the impossible, aims at having Japan survive to at least Fall 1945, and perhaps longer. Of course, as always, German successes make this more likely. And Japan may regret not planting rice while the monsoons rain, as the additional forces may well be missed in 1942 and 1943.

Whether the plan actually works will depend on many factors, and will be revealed in the next issue.

### Japanese force pool expansion

		<i>Air</i>							<i>Military</i>							<i>Naval</i>				
		Jets	NAS	AAF	Int	Str B	Air T	NAT	1-3	2-3	3-3	1-2	2-2	3-2	1m2	1n2	Tr	ASW	Subs	SBP
1	At St		[10]	[10]				3	[2]	[2]		[20]	[10]	[5]		[1]	[18]		1	3
3	Fall	M1	2[12]						1[3]	1[3]				3[8]	1[1]				1[2]	
9	Win																			
1940 Pr.			5[17]																	
1	Spr																			
9	Sum																			
4	Fall	M2	6[23]	1[11]																4
0	Win	M3																		
1941 Pr.																				
1	Spr		5[28]								1[1]	1[21]	1[11]							
9	Sum											4[25]	2[13]	2[10]						
4	Fall		6[34]	2[13]																
1	Win	M4		2[15]																
1942 Pr.			1[35]		1[1]									1[11]				1[1]		
1	Spr		2[37]	2[15]																
9	Sum											1[26]	2[15]	1[12]						
4	Fall																			
2	Win			4[19]																

### Note on Rule Updates

The rules referred to in this issue are those which were in effect for the 2006 convention. Refinements such as the application of the "heavy/light" rules to Japanese shipbuilding, adjustments to the number of Japanese destroyers and transports, the weakening of the Manila garrison and the dedicated RP for Japanese intelligence would affect some minor details of the Japanese plan. As always, see the website for the most current rules.

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